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Abstract: Increasing private wildfire risk mitigation is an important part of the larger 
forest restoration policy challenge. Data from an economic experiment are used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of providing fuel treatments on public land adjacent to private 
land to induce private wildfire risk mitigation. Results show evidence of “crowding out” 
where public spending can decrease the level of private risk mitigation. However, a 
policy prescription that ameliorates this crowding out is identified. Participants undertake 
more mitigation when fuel treatments on publicly owned lands are conditional on a 
threshold level of private mitigation effort and information describing each participant’s 
spending is provided. 
 
3 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Responding to increasing wildfire risk is an important policy challenge in the 
Western U.S. and elsewhere (Donovan and Brown 2005).  Defined as “the area where 
houses meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland vegetation,” the wildland-urban 
interface (WUI) is an area of particular significance (Hammer et al. 2008, pg. 5). Land 
ownership in the WUI commonly follows a mosaic pattern, where the intermixed public 
and private land make wildfire risk a collective problem.  Referred to as the “mitigation 
paradox” (Steelman 2007), private landowners and communities frequently fail to 
undertake sufficient wildfire risk mitigation.  The objective of this paper is to use the 
tools of experimental economics to help design and explore policy packages for 
confronting the mitigation paradox, and inducing increased private risk mitigation. 
Surveys of homeowners indicate that conditions on adjacent properties are an 
important consideration in mitigation decisions (Brenkert, Champ, and Flores 2005). 
WUI homeowners recognize the threat of wildfire as a collective problem.  Forest 
management regimes are increasingly accounting for this by providing risk mitigation on 
publically owned lands adjacent to privately owned lands (U.S. Congress 2000; U.S. 
Congress 2009). The effectiveness of these types of policies to induce additional private 
risk mitigation is unclear and motivates this research.      
Data from a computerized laboratory experiment (with 244 participants and 2,490 
choices) are used to explore the potential response of WUI homeowners to the 
introduction of policy tools. The experimental design builds on a number of recent 
studies (McKee et al. 2004; Talberth et al. 2006; Berrens et al. 2007) with the current 
focus on two potential policies that recognize the prevalent public-private land mosaic in 
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the WUI: (i) a policy where wildfire risk mitigation takes place on surrounding public 
land; and (ii) a policy where mitigation on surrounding public land takes place only if a 
threshold number of individuals have undertaken fuel reductions. The modeling of 
participants’ mitigation decisions controls for risk aversion and social trust, as well as 
information provision.  In creating a total of six treatment cells, the two policy treatments 
are compared against a no action baseline case, and then all three settings are evaluated 
with and without the provision of information on the risk mitigation behavior of other 
participants.   
Results indicate that public spending can have the unintended effect of decreasing 
the amount of private risk mitigation. However, a policy prescription that ameliorates this 
crowding out is identified. A policy of providing fuel treatments on public land 
conditional on a threshold of private risk mitigation while simultaneously disseminating 
collective information describing each participant’s effort is shown to increase participant 
spending on wildfire risk mitigation.  
 
II. Background and Motivation   
The wildfire problem in the Western U.S. and elsewhere is worsening due to a 
combination of natural and human factors. The WUI is expanding. During the 1990s, the 
WUI grew in area by 19% and in number of households by 22%, such that in 2000, the 
WUI represented 11% of the total land area (715,000 km2) and 38% of all housing units 
(44.3 million) for the coterminous US (Hammer et al. 2008). Fuel loads have also grown 
as wildfire has been increasingly suppressed in effort to protect homes situated in the 
WUI (Kovacs 2001; Donovan and Brown 2005). Combined with long-term drought and 
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accumulating fuel loads the expansion of the WUI has significantly increased the risk of 
high intensity fires (USDA 2003; Donovan and Brown 2005; Westerling et al. 2006).   
As a result, large wildfires are occurring more often and are burning an expanding 
area. On USDA Forest Service lands for example, average annual acres burned increased 
from 285,000 from 1970-1986 to 1,000,000 from 1987-2002 (Calkin et al. 2005).  The 
pecuniary costs of wildfire are also rising; annual federal appropriations in the US for 
wildland fire management activities have increased from an average of $1.2 billion from 
fiscal years 1996-2000 to an average of $2.9 billion during fiscal years 2001-2007 
(Nazzaro 2009). Suppression costs typically account for more than 60 percent of the 
annual federal costs of wildfire management activities and are growing as well (US 
Government Accountability Office 2007).  These rising costs combined with the 
recognition of wildfire as natural and beneficial process have lead to growing sentiment 
that a suppression-centered wildfire policy is unwise (Franklin and Agee 2003; Berry 
2007; Donovan and Brown 2007).  
 Moving away from a costly policy focus on suppression requires the re-
introduction of natural fire regimes at a landscape scale (Franklin and Agee 2003; 
Donovan and Brown 2007), while also targeting fuel treatment and risk mitigation efforts 
to protect at-risk WUI communities (Harbour et al. 2009). These risk-mitigating efforts 
include: reducing the volume of fuel in an area, using flame resistant building materials, 
applying flame retardants, creating strategic breaks in fuel sources, and removing ladder 
fuels that facilitate fires spreading into the forest canopy (Murnane 2006). Because 
mitigation can potentially reduce suppression costs in the WUI as well as avoid aesthetic 
6 
 
costs associated with wildfire, a change in priorities is underway, increasing the focus on 
these types of preventative actions (O’Toole 2006; USDA 2006).   
 Though fuel treatments on public lands are ongoing as a part of the National Fire 
Plan (USDA and US Department of Interior 2000) and Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 
2003 (U.S. Congress 2003), wildfire risk mitigation by government alone is insufficient 
on three counts. First, a significant amount of forested land (58% in the U.S.) is privately 
owned (Smith et al. 2004). Second, the scope of wildfire is such that there is simply too 
much land in need of fuel reductions to be paid for with public funds alone. Recent 
analyses find that nearly 400 million acres of forestland across the U.S. are characterized 
as either of “moderate” or “high” risk of catastrophic fire (Power 2006). Juxtaposed 
against these 400 million acres in need of treatment, the federal government has financed 
treatments on less than 3 million acres in recent years (Power 2006). Third, inefficient 
levels of wildfire risk mitigation are expected from individuals in the WUI because of the 
risk externalities associated with fuel treatments (Crowley et al. 2009). Here, risk 
externalities (sometimes called adjacency externalities) describe the wildfire 
characteristic of risk being shared across property lines, and that actions taken to mitigate 
wildfire risk on one property concurrently reduce the risk of fire in the surrounding area 
(Konoshima 2008). In this way, wildfire risk mitigation can be thought of as a public 
good (Busby et al. 2007). Termed the “mitigation paradox,” (Steelman 2007) the 
behavior of individuals confronting shared wildfire risk is consistent with theoretical 
predictions; private individuals do not undertake a sufficient level of wildfire risk 
mitigation. This suggests a potential role for policy to induce WUI homeowners to 
undertake risk mitigation. 
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  In practice, a varied set of policy responses are being implemented, including 
subsidizing private spending on fuel treatments1, enacting legislation that marries 
insurance availability and premiums to risk mitigating behavior (Wallace 2005), and 
providing education about wildfire risk and fuel treatments (Sturtevant and McCaffrey 
2006). This paper focuses on the effectiveness of a specific approach: providing wildfire 
risk mitigation on public lands that are adjacent to privately owned lands. 
A number of collaborative, community-forestry-based management programs 
have been implemented that fund risk mitigation on public lands that are adjacent to 
private lands.  One notable example is the ongoing federal Collaborative Forest 
Restoration Program (CFRP) in New Mexico, and potentially at a broader national level 
the recently-enacted Forest Landscape Restoration Program (FLRP) (U.S. Congress 
2000; U.S. Congress 2009).  One rationale underlying these programs is that landowners 
mitigation decisions are increasingly thought to be influenced by the extent of risk 
mitigation taking place in the surrounding area (Brenkert, Champ, and Flores 2005; 
Martin et al. 2007).  While evaluation of the effectiveness of collaborative, community 
forest management programs has begun (American Forests et al. 2005; Prante et al. 
2007), the potential of fuel reductions on public lands to generate wildfire risk mitigation 
on adjacent private lands remains largely unknown.    
The issue of how to induce private wildfire risk mitigation is attracting increasing 
attention from researchers. Two lines of work are particularly relevant here: one set of 
analyses have addressed the issue with theoretical models and the use of numerical 
simulation (Amacher et al. 2005; Lankoande 2005; Amacher et al. 2006; Shafran 2008a; 
Crowley et al. 2009), and a second set of studies making use of laboratory experiments 
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(McKee et al. 2004; Talberth et al. 2006; Berrens et al. 2007; Shafran 2008b). Evidence 
from both lines of research suggests that policy can be effective in inducing private risk 
mitigation. However, this is tempered by the observation of policy in some instances 
crowding out private risk mitigation (McKee et al. 2004; Berrens et al. 2007; Crowley et 
al. 2009). Although the overall objective of increasing private spending on wildfire risk 
mitigation remains, identifying policy tools that ameliorate crowding out while also 
providing public spending on wildfire risk mitigation emerges as another objective.  
 
III. Experiment Design  
This section describes the experiment. The experiment took place during the Fall 
2007, Spring 2008, and Fall 2008 semesters at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. 
Undergraduate student were recruited from across the university as subjects. Upon 
entering the lab, each subject was randomly assigned a workstation in a carrel consisting 
of a networked laptop computer, a preamble providing background information on 
homeowners living in the WUI, and a satellite photo showing an example home situated 
in the WUI. The experiment began with the proctor reading the preamble aloud as 
subjects followed along with their hard copies. Once the proctor finished reading the 
preamble, participants were asked to follow the instructions on their laptops.2   
Groups of 12 subjects participated in each session. To mirror the relevant features 
of an environment with intermixed publicly and privately owned land, the 12 participants 
each represented a WUI homeowner and there were 4 additional parcels of publically 
owned land. Risk mitigation on these publicly owned parcels was controlled by the 
experimenter to simulate the policy tools evaluated.  
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Sessions proceeded as follows.  Each participant was endowed with an asset, 
called their “home asset.” Participants earned an income stream in each round based on 
the value of their “home asset.” A random draw took place at the end of each round to 
determine whether the group experienced a wildfire event. If a wildfire event occurred, 
each participant’s home asset decreased in value, thus reducing a participant’s income 
stream in future rounds. However, participants could engage in activities that reduced risk 
exposure, and consequently reduced financial consequences of a wildfire event. Sessions 
lasted 12 rounds but subjects were not informed of the end point.3 Subjects allocated 
income earned from their “home asset” among three goods in each round.  
The first good available to participants was named “Mitigation,” and was intended 
to represent expenditures on real world risk mitigating processes such as fuel reductions.  
There are two benefits from the good “Mitigation.” First, spending on this good reduces 
the probability that the group experienced a wildfire event. Second, spending on 
“Mitigation” reduced the magnitude of the loss participants experienced if a wildfire 
event occurred. As noted earlier, wildfire risk mitigation in real world situations generate 
positive externalities. The good “Mitigation” in the experiment is therefore created such 
that the benefit of a lab dollar spent on the good is accrued not only by the individual 
spending that lab dollar, but to the group as a whole.  
The second good available to participants was called “Insurance,” and was 
intended as a proxy for real world spending on insurance.  When a participant spent a lab 
dollar on “Insurance”, they were reimbursed if a wildfire event occurred. Unlike 
mitigation, the benefit a participant receives from purchasing insurance does not depend 
on the spending behavior of the rest of the group. For every $LAB a participant spends 
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on “Insurance,” $LAB 16 are added back to the value of their home asset if a fire occurs. 
Insurance purchases are only good for the current round.  
The final good participants chose among was called “Savings.” A subject’s 
spending on “Savings” did not impact wildfire behavior in the experiment but instead is 
the principle mechanism by which subjects earned payment for their participation in the 
experiment. At the conclusion of the experiment, each $LAB that a participant spent on 
“Savings” is converted into American dollars and awarded to the subject (in cash).4 The 
behavior of interest is how participants distributed the income they earned each round 
among “Mitigation,” “Insurance,” and “Savings” as experimental treatments were 
introduced. 
Wildfire events in the experiment were designed to follow the properties of 
wildfire in the WUI. Risk mitigation has the potential to reduce the intensity of a fire by 
reducing the amount of available fuel to burn (Kovacs 2001). Fuel reductions can also 
reduce wildfire intensity by inhibiting the spread into the forest canopy where fuel is 
abundant (USDA 2003). Homeowner’s risk exposure is thought to be determined not 
only by the conditions on their property, but also by the conditions of the surrounding 
landscape (Finney 2006; Scott 2006).  Similarly, the benefits of mitigation not only 
accrue to the individual but by everyone in the vicinity; mitigation generates a positive 
externality for the surrounding area. Further, because wildfire risk is shared, the 
effectiveness of risk mitigation also depends upon the conditions on surrounding lands 
(Shafran 2008a). Though weather and topography cannot be altered by mitigation, 
reducing fuel loads provides homeowners a way to slow the spread of wildfire (van 
Wagtendonk 1996; Finney 2001).  
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In the experiment, the probability of a wildfire events is modeled as a function of 
the sum of all participants spending on “Mitigation” in the round, the number of 
participants engaging in mitigation, and the number of rounds that have elapsed since the 
previous wildfire event (this simulates fuel accumulation in the absence of wildfire). For 
the experiment, this was parameterized with the following function: 
 ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−+= − 6000/601
48/)01.0*(4.0 GMITe
NREπ                                                         (1) 
where π  is the probability of a wildfire event occurring, RE is the rounds elapsed since 
the last wildfire event, N is the number of participants mitigating, and GMIT is the sum 
of all participants spending on “Mitigation” in the round.5  
The process is complex and, of course, the participants do not directly observe 
equation (1).  Instead, via the computer interface, subjects can see how much each lab 
dollar spent on mitigation will reduce risk exposure through trial and error with two 
“sliders.” Subjects drag scrollbars representing the number of participants undertaking 
risk mitigation and the level of mitigation undertaken by the group, respectively. As 
participants change their conjecture regarding the group decisions, the projected 
probability of wildfire and potential losses presented at the bottom right corner of the 
screen change.  Through the use of these sliders the process of wildfire risk mitigation 
that is characterized by equation (1) is presented. 6 
 As with wildfire probability, the severity of the loss in value of their home assets 
in the event of a wildfire is determined by the sum of all participants spending on 
“Mitigation” in the round and the number of participants engaging in mitigation. If a 
wildfire event takes place in a round, equation (2) is used to determine event severity: 
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 ⎟
⎠
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−= − 3600/361
24/71.0 GMITe
NLOSS                                                                        (2) 
LOSS is the proportion of a participant’s home asset value that is lost due to the wildfire, 
N is the number of participants mitigating, and GMIT is the sum of all participants 
spending on “Mitigation” in the round. As before, participants use the sliders to form 
estimates of how spending on “Mitigation” and the number of participants undertaking 
mitigation will reduce the severity of a potential loss.  
 ( )16**1 irrr INSLOSSVVV +−=+                                                                      (3) 
Where 1+rV is the value of a participant’s home asset in round 1+r , rV is the value of a 
participant’s home asset in round r , LOSS is the proportion of a participant’s home asset 
value that is lost due to the wildfire, and iINS is the number of $LAB the participant spent 
on the good “Insurance” in the round. 
A factorial experimental design is used; refer to Table 2 for a summary of the 
treatments. Noted in the previous section, we are interested in how the introduction of the 
simulated policy of fuel treatments taking place on adjacent public land influences 
participant behavior. Such a policy is simulated in the experiment by manipulating 
equations (1) and (2). For treatments where mitigation has taken place on publically 
owned land, N is increased by 4 to reflect simulated treatments on 4 parcels of public 
land and GMIT  by $LAB 60,000 to simulate $LAB 15,000 of “Mitigation” spending on 
each of these 4 parcels. Additionally, we examine the influence of making participant 
spending decisions publically known.  In sessions implemented “With Information,” 
participants can view a map on their laptops describing each other’s spending in the 
previous round; this is in contrast to sessions implemented “Without Information.”  
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IV. Data Analysis 
In all 22 sessions involving 244 subjects were completed, generating 2,490 
decisions for analysis. The econometric analysis assumes that participant behavior with 
respect to decisions over spending on wildfire risk mitigation in the experiment can be 
characterized by the following model: 
 ( )csDemographinDescriptiolAttitudinasticsCharacteriTreatmentNonTreatment XXXXfSpending ,,, −−−=   (3) 
where TreatmentX  is a vector of variables describing the treatment invoked, 
sticsCharacteriTreatmentNonX −−  is a vector of variables that control for differences in sessions or 
rounds not attributed to changes in treatments, nDescriptiolAttitudinaX − is a vector of variables 
characterizing participants’ responses to a set of questions regarding risk and trust, and 
csDemographiX  is a vector of demographic variables. 
Success for wildfire policy can be defined in several ways. As a result, the 
econometric approach uses several models. One possible policy goal is to increase the 
level of wildfire risk mitigation that WUI homeowners undertake. Proponents of this goal 
argue that because WUI homeowners accrue much of the benefit of wildfire risk 
mitigation, policy should focus on shifting more of the corresponding financial burden of 
providing these treatments to these individuals (O’Toole 2006; USDA 2006). The 
variable MIT is defined as the number of lab dollars a participant allocates to the good 
“Mitigation” in a round and is used as the dependent variable in the first of the estimated 
models. The spending of participant i on MIT is modeled as follows: 
tisticsCharacteriTreatmentNon
nDescriptiolAttitudinacsDemographiTreatmenti
eX
XXXMIT
,++
+++=
−−
−
β
βββα
        (4) 
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where α  represents an intercept term, β  represents the estimated coefficients 
corresponding to the vectors of explanatory variables, and tie , is an error term. 
Another perspective is that the policy objective should be more general, and that 
alongside increasing mitigation spending should be the goal of increasing private 
spending on insurance. Though insurance does not speak to the externality aspects of 
wildfire risk, insurance has obvious benefits at an individual level and public benefits 
insofar as homeowners with adequate insurance coverage from private markets are less 
likely to require public assistance in the event of a disaster. The variables INSURANCE 
and TOTAL are created to reflect this possible goal. INSURANCE is the number of lab 
dollars a participant allocates to the good “Insurance” in a round and TOTAL is defined 
as the sum of INSURANCE and MIT within a round.  The spending of participant i on 
TOTAL is modeled with equation (5): 
tisticsCharacteriTreatmentNon
nDescriptiolAttitudinacsDemographiTreatmenti
eX
XXXTOTAL
,++
+++=
−−
−
β
βββα                                     (5) 
where again α  represents an intercept term, β  represents the estimable coefficients 
corresponding to the vectors of explanatory variables, and tie , is an error term. 
Finally, increasing the number of homeowners that undertake mitigation is an 
additional potential policy goal. The variable MITDV is created to evaluate this 
objective. MITDV is a dummy variable coded as 1 where a participant undertakes some 
mitigation and 0 otherwise.  Defining X as the groups of variables introduced above 
in TreatmentX , csDemographiX , nDescriptiolAttitudinaX _ , and sticsCharacteriSessionTreatmentNonX __−  , and Φ  as 
the standard normal cumulative distribution,7 the decision of whether to allocate any lab 
dollars to “Mitigation” is analyzed with random effects probit modeling (6):  
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 ( ) ( )βXXMITDVi Φ== 1Pr                                                                              (6) 
For each model, multiple observations are taken from the same session. A concern 
is that the error terms for such observations are not independent. As a result, random 
effects modeling is used to analyze the data for each of the three models presented here. 
By using three models that differ in dependent variables but are similar in the sets of 
regressors included in the specifications presented here, a framework is constructed to 
examine the impact of potential policy tools on a varied set of possible objectives.  
Table 1 presents a list of the variables used in the modeling and descriptive 
statistics. The vector TreatmentX  is made up of a set of dummy variables that distinguish the 
sessions by the policy regime implemented. Table 2 provides descriptions of the 
treatments implemented in the experiment.  Both of the policy tools are implemented in 
the experiment in two ways: once “with information” where participants have access to a 
map on the screen that provides a description of all participants’ mitigation spending in 
the previous round, and once “without information,” where participants’ mitigation 
spending decisions are kept private.8   
Used for comparison against treatments where explicit policy tools are 
implemented, two variables designate the baseline case where no policy is invoked. 
BASEWO and BASEW are dummy variables coded as 1 where no policy tool is 
implemented (without and with information, respectively), and 0 otherwise.  
The variable PL_TREATED_WO and PL_TREATED_W are dummy variables 
coded as 1 for sessions where the experimenter has simulated mitigation taking place on 
the public land (without and with information, respectively) and 0 otherwise.9  
16 
 
The expectation is that simulated policies of wildfire risk mitigation on public 
land will increase risk-mitigating behavior in the experiment. That is, each of the three 
measures of success introduced above (the level of spending on mitigation, the level of 
total protective spending, and the probability that a participant engages in mitigation) are 
expected to be positively influenced when these policy tools are enacted. Tested against 
the null hypotheses of no statistically significant influence are the alternative hypotheses 
that the treatments increase spending on risk mitigation relative to the baseline treatment: 
H1: 0__ >WOTREATEDPLβ  
H2: 0__ >WTREATEDPLβ    
The influence of an additional policy tool is considered.  Noted earlier, fuel 
treatments on public land have in some instances been conditional on the commitment 
exhibited to the problem on surrounding private lands (Prante et al. 2007).  An example is 
the community collaboration requirements of cost-share programs for treating public 
lands in the federal Collaborative Forest Restoration Program (CFRP) in New Mexico 
(Prante et al. 2007). The variables POSSIBLE_PLT_WO and POSSIBLE_PLT_W are 
created to analyze the effectiveness making fuel treatment on public land contingent upon 
a threshold of private participation. The dummy variables POSSIBLE_PLT_WO and 
POSSIBLE_PLT_W are coded as 1 for treatments where the public land in the 
experiment is treated only if six or more participants undertake mitigation in the previous 
round (without and with information, respectively). Compared against the null of no 
statistically significant effect, the following hypotheses are tested to analyze the influence 
of these treatments: 
H3: 0__ >WOPLTPOSSIBLEβ  
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H4: 0__ >LWPLTPOSSIBLEβ  
 Transitioning to the control variables, the vector sticsCharacteriTreatmentNonX −−  is a set of 
variables that distinguish session or round characteristics. The variable ROUND_INC is 
defined as the number of lab dollars a participant receives at the outset of each round to 
allocate between “Mitigation,” “Insurance,” and “Savings.” The variable WEALTH is 
defined as the sum of a participant’s “Savings” through the current completed round. 
Within a session, the time elapsed since a wildfire occurred varies by round and has the 
potential to influence behavior. The variable FIREPREV is a dummy variable coded as 1 
if a fire occurred in the previous round, 0 otherwise.10 The final two variables included in 
this category measure the level of interaction a participant exhibits with the software. 
DIAGRAM is a dummy variable coded as 1 where a participant decided to view a map 
that provided a more detailed description of the allocation decisions of others than is 
presented, and 0 otherwise. The variable SLIDER is a dummy coded as 1 if a participant 
adjusted the slider corresponding to group “Mitigation” to evaluate how the probability 
and severity of wildfire change with group spending on “Mitigation” and 0 otherwise. 
The vector nDescriptiolAttitudinaX − is made up of variables that capture differences in 
participant responses to a set of questions after the experiment. Because participants are 
asked to make decisions that impact probabilities of an uncertain payoff, it is especially 
important to control for risk preferences. To this end, subjects participated in a widely 
used risk preference elicitation task (Holt and Laury 2002). In this task, each made a 
series of choices between two payoff options, one providing a lower payoff with certainty 
and the other providing either a higher payoff or nothing at varying probabilities. The 
behavior of interest is at the point where the probability of getting the higher payoff 
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increases such that a participant switches from preferring the sure payoff to the gamble. 
Using observed choices in this task as a measure of risk preferences, a dummy variable 
was constructed to sort participants by risk aversion. RISKAV is a dummy variable coded 
as 1 if a participant displayed risk-averse preferences in the risk elicitation task, and 0 
otherwise.11 Results from this elicitation task are revealed after the wildfire experiment.  
In addition to controlling for risk preferences, nDescriptiolAttitudinaX − also includes a 
variable that controls for participants’ beliefs regarding social capital. The General Social 
Survey (GSS) is an extensive survey with the objective of collecting data to monitor and 
characterize trends in American culture.12 While the GSS has been used in addressing a 
variety of social science questions, it is increasingly being used in economics analyses 
involving collective action (Karlan 2005). An index created from responses to a question 
from the GSS is used here as a proxy for social capital. The question put to participants 
was the GSS trust question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 13 Participants select one 
of six responses to the question that best describes their beliefs. A set of dummy variables 
has been created here to correspond with these responses. The variable TRUST is a 
dummy coded as 1 where a participant selects the option most consistent with well 
developed social capital (“Most people can be trusted”). The dummy variable NTRUST 
is coded as 1 where a participant selects the response most consistent with a lack of social 
capital (“You can’t be too careful”). These two variables are summed to construct a trust 
index. The variable T_INDEX is defined as TRUST-NTRUST, so that the variable takes 
the value of a 1 for trusting participants, -1 for non-trusting participants, and 0 if the 
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participant selected any of the other possible responses to the trust question (“It 
Depends,” “Don’t Know,” “No Answer,” or “Not Applicable”).  
To evaluate the relationship between social capital (as measured by trust) and 
mitigation decisions, Hypothesis 5 is: 
H5: 0_ >INDEXTβ  
The vector csDemographiX includes a set of control variables. Participants report 
demographic information at the conclusion of the experiment. FEMALE is a dummy 
coded as 1 if a participant identifies themselves as female, 0 otherwise. AGE is the age in 
years of the participant. The variable EDUCATION is the number of years of formal 
education.14 Not to be confused with their income earned in the experiment, the variable 
ANNUAL_INC is defined as a participant’s annual income.15 HOMEOWNER is a 
dummy coded as 1 where a participant owns their home, 0 otherwise. csDemographiX  
includes dummy variables that control for political party affiliation. DEMOCRAT and 
REPUBLICAN are dummy variables coded as 1 for membership in the identified party 
and 0 otherwise, and OTHERPARTY is a dummy coded as 1 for participants that do not 
identify their political party as Democrat or Republican, and 0 otherwise. 
 
V. Econometric Results  
  The discussion of the econometric results is organized by the dependent variable 
analyzed. Thus the influence of treating publically owned land on the likelihood of a 
participant undertaking risk mitigation (Models 1A and 1B), the amount participants 
spend on risk mitigation (Models 2A and 2B), and the amount participants spend on 
mitigation and insurance summed (Models 3A and 3B) is presented in turn.  Estimation 
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results are presented in Table 3. Trimmed and an extended specifications presented for 
each of the three dependent variables used (MITDV, MIT and TOTAL).  Additional 
specifications were also evaluated, with results  qualitatively consistent with the 
modeling presented here (available upon request).  A Hausman test is used to assess the 
appropriateness of using random effects modeling. For the extended specification using 
the dependent variable MIT (Model 2B), the chi-squared test statistic is -34.44, indicating 
that the estimated coefficients in the random effects model are statistically similar to the 
coefficients from a fixed effects model (known to produce consistent estimates).    
 Beginning first with Models 1A and 1B, the effectiveness of fuel treatments on 
publically owned lands to increase the probability that a participant undertakes private 
risk mitigation is mixed. The estimated coefficients for the variables PL_TREATED_WO 
and POSSIBLE_PLT_WO are positive but statistically significant for only one 
specification. This implies that when fuel treatments are simulated on publically owned 
lands and participant spending is kept private, subjects are not more likely to undertake 
risk mitigation than in the baseline session. Similarly, the statistically insignificant 
coefficients for BASE_W indicate that making subject spending public alone did not 
increase the probability of mitigation. However, simulating fuel treatments on publically 
owned lands is effective when participant spending is made public.  The estimated 
coefficients for PL_TREATED_W and POSSIBLE_PLT_W are positive and statistically 
significant in 3 of 4 specifications presented. The results therefore suggest that to 
effectively increase the likelihood of a homeowner engaging in risk mitigation, fuel 
treatments should be provided in conjunction with information dissemination.  The 
estimated coefficient for T_INDEX is not statistically significant for this set of models. 
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The marginal effects presented in brackets in Table 3 show the change in 
probability of undertaking risk mitigation as the variable of interest changes from 0 to 1. 
Marginal effects for this model are calculated as:  
 ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −=
∧∧
PPME 1β                                                                                                 (7) 
The marginal effects for PL_TREATED_WO and PL_TREATED_W in the 
extended specification are relatively large, 0.06 and 0.11 respectively. 
 Of the control variables, the estimated coefficients for WEALTH and AGE are 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that participants that have allocated more 
to “Savings” in previous rounds and older are less likely to undertake risk mitigation. The 
estimated coefficient for FEMALE is positive and significant indicating that female 
participants are more likely to undertake mitigation than the base case (males). The 
coefficients for the remaining control variables are not statistically significant. 
 As with the results discussed above, the impact of simulated fuel treatments on 
the level of participant spending is influenced by whether participants are information 
describing one another’s spending.  Shown in Models 2A and 2B, the negative and 
significant coefficients for PL_TREATED_WO and POSSIBLE_PLT_WO (negative but 
not significant in the trimmed specification) suggest that spending on fuel treatments 
taking place on publically owned land is replacing private spending. As observed 
elsewhere (McKee et al. 2004; Berrens et al. 2007), subjects in these sessions spent less 
on risk mitigation than their counterparts in baseline sessions. Significantly though, 
disseminating information ameliorates the crowding out. The estimated coefficients for 
PL_TREATED_W are not statistically significant.  This suggests that the addition of 
information dissemination mutes the negative influence observed in the 
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PL_TREATED_WO sessions. Further, the estimated coefficients for 
POSSIBLE_PLT_W are positive and statistically significant. The behavior observed here 
therefore suggests that information dissemination combined with a policy of making fuel 
treatments on publically owned lands contingent on private spending can successfully 
induce private risk mitigation. There is a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
for T_INDEX, indicating that participants that are more trusting spend more on risk 
mitigation than their counterparts. 
  Of the control variables included in Models 2A and 2B, the estimated coefficients 
for WEALTH, RISKAV, AGE, and FEMALE are negative and significant. The 
estimated coefficients for DIAGRAM, SLIDER, T_INDEX, HOMEOWNER, and 
REPUBLICAN are positive and significant. The coefficients for the remaining control 
variables are not statistically significant for this set of models. 
 In the experiment, fuel treatments on publically owned lands influence mitigation 
spending and total protective spending (sum of mitigation and insurance spending) 
similarly.16  In Models 3A and 3B, estimated coefficients for PL_TREATED_WO and 
POSSIBLE_PLT_WO are negative and statistically significant in 3 of 4 models. This 
indicates that the policy tool has reduced private spending. However, when information is 
provided in conjunction with fuel treatments on public lands, this crowding out is 
ameliorated. Estimated coefficients for POSSIBLE_PLT_W are positive and significant, 
indicating that participants undertook more total protective spending when this policy 
was implemented. As before, the negative and significant coefficient for BASE_W 
suggests that it is the combination of fuel treatments and information dissemination, 
rather than fuel treatments or information alone that generates increased mitigation 
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spending. Participants that are more trusting spend higher amounts on mitigation and 
insurance in sum as shown by the significant positive coefficient for T_INDEX.  
 Of the control variables in Model 3B, the estimated coefficients for 
ROUND_INC, FIREPREV, DIAGRAM, T_INDEX, and REPUBLICAN are positive 
and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for WEALTH, RISKAV, 
FEMALE, and EDUCATION are negative and significant. The coefficients for all other 
variables are not statistically distinct from zero in these models. 
    
VI. Discussion and Conclusions 
 The objective of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of providing fuel 
treatments on adjacent publicly-owned lands at increasing private spending on wildfire 
risk mitigation. A computerized financial experiment is created where incentives for 
participants broadly parallels the incentives of WUI homeowners. Using the observed 
decisions of participants as a policy guidepost, several observations stand out.   
Results provide further evidence that policy tools intending to induce WUI 
homeowners to engage in risk mitigation have the potential to reduce private spending. 
This effect is identified both for treatments that simulate risk mitigation taking place on 
public lands irrespective of private behavior and for treatments that offer risk mitigation 
on public lands conditional upon a sufficient number of individuals undertaking private 
risk mitigation. Thus, the results suggest that particular care should be taken in policy 
design to avoid crowding out and reducing private spending on risk mitigation.  
The results indentify a specific antidote for this unintended effect: disseminating 
particular information on the behavior of others sharing the same risk externality. 
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Behavior in the experiment is influenced by both simulated fuel treatments on public land 
as well as information provision. Robust across multiple models and specifications, we 
find that when implemented alongside a policy of fuel treatments on public lands, 
providing participants with information describing each other’s mitigation decisions 
dampens the degree to which private spending is reduced. Further, when this information 
is provided along with a policy regime of providing fuel treatments on public lands only 
if there is sufficient number of individuals engaging in risk mitigation, participants 
increase their spending on wildfire risk mitigation.  
Because programs like New Mexico’s federal Collaborative Forest Restoration 
Program (CFRP) [and by inference the newly-initiated, national-level Forest Landscape 
Restoration Program (FLRP)] are costly to implement relative to standard fuels reduction 
efforts, whether they generate spillover mitigation on adjacent private lands is an 
important consideration. That is, adding collaboration, and community-capacity building 
requirements to fuels reduction projects (or funding opportunities) increases project costs, 
but may generate important spillover benefits. Shepherd et al. (2009) provide recent 
evidence that relative to other National Fire Plan fuels reduction projects, CFRP projects 
in New Mexico exhibit significantly improved social equity effects by better targeting 
poor communities, with no identifiable loss in risk targeting. This supports the potential 
of such programs to induce increased private mitigation. However, given that participants 
in the experiment increase mitigation spending only when information is disseminated in 
conjunction with providing fuel treatments on public lands that are conditional on private 
participation, we find both that both aspects of the policy prescription are important.  
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Providing fuel treatments on publicly-owned lands has a disparate influence on 
seemingly similar measures of mitigating behavior. This can be observed in the results 
from sessions where fuel treatments took place without information dissemination 
(PL_TREATED_WO).  Here, the policy tool increases the probability that a participant 
will undertake some mitigation but decreases the level of spending on mitigation. It is 
therefore possible to increase the number individuals engaging in wildfire risk mitigation  
(e.g., possibly through a demonstration effect) while at the same time decreasing the total 
level of mitigation (e.g., a possible crowding out effect).. Given the spatial complexities 
of wildfire risk, it is not obvious whether the negative impact of decreased aggregate 
expenditures outweighs the positive impact of more people mitigating.  Results suggest 
that policymakers may have to prioritize among policy objectives, weighing the potential 
gains associated with more individuals undertaking wildfire risk mitigation with costs 
associated with a reduction in the total level of risk mitigation that takes place.    
Finally, the importance of information dissemination in observed mitigation 
decisions underscores the idea that social factors are critical in analyzing the “Mitigation 
Paradox.” It has been suggested that developing social capital in forest communities is a 
worthwhile goal of policy, insofar as increased social capital can lead to increased levels 
of participation and/or private spending on wildfire risk mitigation. Again, this idea 
appears to be at least part of the motivation behind community forestry-based cost-share 
programs (e.g., CFRP and FLRP). The observed behavior here that higher levels of trust 
are a positive determinant of mitigation spending suggests that developing social capital 
is a worthwhile endeavor for policy.  
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics (N=2,490). 
Variable Description Mean(SD) 
MIT The number of lab dollars ($LAB) a participant 
spends on the good “Mitigation” in a round. 
2,463.11 
(2,697.71) 
INSURANCE The number of lab dollars ($LAB) a participant 
spends on the good “Insurance” in a round. 
2,486.87 
(2,332.82) 
TOTAL Sum of the number of lab dollars a participant 
spends on total risk reduction for both goods 
“Mitigation” and “Insurance” in a round. 
4,949.98 
(3,970.35) 
MITDV Dummy variable coded as 1 if a participant spends 
at least 1 lab dollar on the good “Mitigation” in a 
round, 0 otherwise. 
0.86 
(0.34) 
BASE_WO Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where no 
policy tool is implemented and subjects are not 
provided information describing the spending of 
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise.  
0.19 
(0.39) 
BASE_W Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where no 
policy tool is implemented and subjects are 
provided information describing the spending of 
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise 
0.19 
(0.39) 
PL_TREATED_WO Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where the 
public land has been treated and subjects are not 
provided information describing the spending of 
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise. 
0.12 
(0.33) 
PL_TREATED_W Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where the 
public land has been treated and subjects are 
provided information describing the spending of 
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise. 
0.17 
(0.38) 
POSSIBLE_PLT_WO Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where 
contingent public land is invoked and subjects are 
not provided information describing the spending 
of their fellow participants, 0 otherwise. 
0.18 
(0.38) 
 
POSSIBLE_PLT_W Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where 
contingent public land is invoked and subjects are 
provided information describing the spending of 
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise. 
0.14 
(0.35) 
ROUND_INC The number of lab dollars a participant receives at 
the outset of the round. 
13,248.81 
(2,683.99) 
WEALTH Sum of a participant’s “Savings” from each 
completed round. 
48,281.91 
(33,490.30)
FIREPREV Dummy variable coded as 1 if a fire occurred in 
the previous round, 0 otherwise. 
0.19 
(0.39) 
DIAGRAM Dummy variable coded as 1 if during the 
experiment the participant clicked on the diagram 
providing more in depth information regarding the 
spending pattern of the group in the previous 
0.24 
(0.43) 
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round, 0 otherwise 
SLIDER Dummy variable coded as 1 if during the 
experiment the participant adjusted the slider that 
shows how the level of group spending changes 
the impact of the good “Mitigation,” 0 otherwise. 
0.77 
(0.42) 
RISKAV Dummy variable coded as 1 for participant’s 
whose choices in the risk aversion elicitation task 
indicate risk averse preferences, 0 otherwise.  
0.66 
(0.47) 
TRUST Dummy variable coded as 1 for participants who 
when asked the question “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?” selected the response “Most people can 
be trusted,” 0 otherwise. 
0.31 
(0.46) 
NTRUST Dummy variable coded as 1 for participants who 
when asked the question “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?” selected the response “You can’t be too 
careful,” 0 otherwise. 
0.36 
(0.48) 
T_INDEX A constructed trust index from responses to the 
GSS “Trust Question.” T_INDEX=TRUST-
NTRUST. 
-0.05 
(0.81) 
FEMALE Dummy variable coded as 1 if a participant is 
female, 0 otherwise. 
0.40 
(0.49) 
AGE Age of a participant. 22.27 
(5.23) 
EDUCATION Number of years of schooling a participant has 
completed. 
14.20 
(2.45) 
ANNUAL_INC A participant’s annual household income ($). 32,409.64 
(21,900.39)
HOMEOWNER Dummy variable coded as 1 if a participant is a 
homeowner, 0 otherwise. 
0.15 
(0.35) 
DEMOCRAT Dummy variable coded 1 if a participant’s political 
party is Democrat, 0 otherwise. 
0.19 
(0.39) 
REPUBLICAN Dummy variable coded 1 if a participant’s political 
party is Republican, 0 otherwise. 
0.27 
(0.44) 
OTHERPARTY Dummy variable coded 1 if a participant does not 
identify their political party as Democrat or 
Republican, 0 otherwise. 
0.55 
(0.50) 
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Table 2.  Treatment Table. 
Treatment 
name 
Land Treatment 
Policy Tool 
Description Information 
Describing the 
Spending of other 
Participants Provided
Variable Designation Number 
of 
Sessions
T1 None Baseline, without information: No land 
treatment policy tool is invoked. 
No BASE_WO 4 
T2 None Baseline, with information: No land 
treatment policy tool is invoked. 
Yes BASE_W 4 
T3 Public land is 
treated 
For each of the four parcels of public land, 
15,000 lab dollars are added to the sum of 
all participants spending on “Mitigation” 
in the round. 
No PL_TREATED_WO 3 
T4 Public land is 
treated 
For each of the four parcels of public land, 
15,000 lab dollars are added to the sum of 
all participants spending on “Mitigation” 
in the round. 
Yes PL_TREATED_W 4 
T5 Public land 
treated 
contingent on 
participation 
If at least 6 participants spent at least 1 lab 
dollar on “Mitigation” in the previous 
round, then for each of the four parcels of 
public land, 15,000 lab dollars are added to 
the sum of all participants spending on 
“Mitigation” in the round. 
No POSSIBLE_PLT_WO 4 
T6 Public land 
treated 
contingent on 
participation 
If at least 6 participants spent at least 1 lab 
dollar on “Mitigation” in the previous 
round, then for each of the four parcels of 
public land, 15,000 lab dollars are added to 
the sum of all participants spending on 
“Mitigation” in the round. 
Yes POSSIBLE_PLT_W 3 
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Table 3. Random Effects Regression Results (N= 2,490). 
Model: 1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 
 Dependent Variable: MITDV Dependent Variable: MIT Dependent Variable: TOTAL 
BASE_W -0.16 
(-0.88) 
[-0.03] 
-0.20 
(-0.97) 
[-0.04] 
-888.71 
(-1.72)* 
-1158.49 
(-6.67)*** 
-994.26 
(-1.22) 
-1092.53 
(-4.73)*** 
PL_TREATED_WO 0.25 
(1.18) 
[0.04] 
0.39 
(1.74)* 
[0.06] 
-946.68 
(-1.68)* 
-579.01 
(-3.12)*** 
-1997.14 
(-2.26)** 
-1558.30 
(-6.32)*** 
PL_TREATED_W 0.76 
(3.68)*** 
[0.11] 
0.89 
(3.86)** 
[0.11] 
-419.58 
(-0.81) 
-242.17 
(-1.27) 
-1167.22 
(-1.43) 
-822.38 
(-3.22)*** 
POSSIBLE_PLT_WO 0.29 
(1.48) 
[0.05] 
0.33 
(1.62) 
[0.05] 
-265.66 
(-0.51) 
-359.51 
(-2.10)*** 
-461.10 
(-0.57) 
-382.23 
(-1.69)* 
POSSIBLE_PLT_W 0.35 
(1.64)* 
[0.06] 
0.26 
(1.14) 
[0.04] 
1027.11 
(1.84)* 
412.56 
(2.13)** 
1246.90 
(1.42) 
715.68 
(2.77)*** 
ROUND_INC --- 1.69e-5 
(1.00) 
[0.00] 
--- 0.05 
(2.23)** 
--- 0.15 
(4.86)*** 
WEALTH --- -8.54e-6 
(-7.15)*** 
[-0.00] 
--- -0.04 
(-25.87)** 
--- -0.06 
(-30.57)*** 
FIREPREV --- 0.01 
(0.07) 
[0.00] 
--- 38.40 
(0.29) 
--- 542.54 
(2.91)*** 
DIAGRAM --- 0.04 
(-0.40) 
[-0.01] 
--- 362.09 
(2.86)*** 
--- 476.66 
(2.66)*** 
SLIDER --- 0.43 
(5.59)*** 
[0.09] 
--- 366.14 
(3.36)*** 
--- 198.88 
(1.29) 
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RISKAV --- -0.06 
(-0.77) 
[-0.01] 
--- -541.73 
(-5.56)*** 
--- -452.02 
(-3.30)*** 
T_INDEX --- 0.05 
(1.09) 
[0.01] 
--- 161.56 
(2.76)*** 
--- 388.86 
(4.71)*** 
 
FEMALE --- 0.51 
(6.27)*** 
[0.08] 
--- -218.98 
(-2.28)** 
 
--- -387.66 
(-2.87)*** 
AGE --- -0.03 
(-4.36)*** 
[-0.01] 
--- -58.98 
(-5.85)*** 
--- 2.08 
(0.15) 
EDUCATION --- 0.10 
(6.26)*** 
[0.02] 
--- 11.36 
(0.55) 
--- -77.14 
(-2.65)*** 
HOMEOWNER --- 0.16 
(1.30) 
[0.03] 
--- 494.34 
(3.49)*** 
--- 37.77 
(0.34) 
ANNUAL_INC --- -2.55e-6 
(-1.45) 
[-0.00] 
--- -1.20e-3 
(-0.53) 
--- -2.64e-3 
(-0.83) 
REPUBLICAN --- 0.10 
(0.11) 
[0.00] 
--- 334.40 
(2.96)*** 
--- 326.14 
(2.05)** 
DEMOCRAT --- -0.13 
(-1.30) 
[-0.02] 
--- 122.49 
(0.99) 
--- 242.41 
(1.39) 
CONSTANT 0.94 
(7.14)*** 
0.17 
(0.45) 
2710.33 
(7.39)*** 
5020.51 
(10.30)** 
5477.50 
(9.51)*** 
7514.90 
(11.01)*** 
Log Likelihood -943.72 -842.83 --- --- --- --- 
Wald Chi squared --- --- 15.51*** 1154.53 14.66 1505.66*** 
Notes: ***,  **,  and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively (two-tailed t-tests). Marginal effects presented 
in brackets
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1  Cost-sharing programs and subsidization of fuel reductions on private lands have 
been used widely; See USDA (2009); Available July 1, 2009 at: 
http://www.wildfireprograms.usda.gov/search.html?search=index&&view=type.  
2  The instructions, along with the screen images participants see throughout the 
experiment are available upon request and can be viewed at 
http://www.cwu.edu/~prantet/Wildfire_Aux_Docs.pdf. 
3  Some sessions were conducted with fewer participants (10 or 11) when less than 
12 were available. The econometric results are not sensitive to the number of participants.  
4  There are four components to participant earnings for the experiment: the sum of 
a participant’s spending on “Savings” for each round, the participant’s earnings from the 
risk elicitation task, and 50% of the participant’s asset value at the conclusion of the 
experiment, and a “show up” payment of five dollars. On average, the experiment lasted 
one hour and 15 minutes and subjects were paid $31.87 for their participation. 
5  In the experiment, the parameters used in equations (1) and (2) determine the 
efficacy of a lab dollar spent on “Mitigation” to reduce risk exposure.  In real world 
applications, the efficacy of risk mitigating behaviors to reduce risk exposure varies as 
local geographies change. The parameters used here are therefore not intended to reflect 
the effectiveness of risk mitigation for all WUI applications but rather were chosen for 
tractability in the experiment.  
6  In addition to the “sliders,” several other steps are taken to facilitate participant 
understanding. First, before the primary experiment, subjects participate in a tutorial on 
the mechanics of the “sliders” (see Screen 3 in the Auxiliary materials located at 
http://www.cwu.edu/~prantet/Wildfire_Aux_Docs.pdf.  Second, two practice rounds take 
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place before participants choices are tied to payoffs. Third, there are buttons near each of 
the sliders labeled “What’s this?” that participants can click on for additional explanation 
about a feature of the experiment (see Screen 16 in the Auxiliary materials). 
7  For completeness, the data has also been analyzed with logit probability models. 
These results are similar and available if requested.  
8  To see how this information is presented, refer to the Auxiliary materials 
located at http://www.cwu.edu/~prantet/Wildfire_Aux_Docs.pdf.  
9  This is incorporated into the equations (1) and (2) by increasing N by 4, to 
reflect simulated treatments on 4 parcels of public land and GMIT by $LAB 60,000 to 
simulate $LAB 15,000 of “Mitigation” spending on each of these 4 parcels. 
10  The variable FIREPREV is coded as 0 for the first round of the session. 
 
11  Risk averse preferences are defined here as preferring the uncertain payoff only 
once the probability of receiving the higher payoff reached 0.6. 
12  This description of the GSS, and additional information describing the GSS is 
available at: http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website, accessed April 30, 2008. 
13  Not presented here, alternative modeling included two additional GSS questions: 
the helpful question, “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or 
that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” and the fairness question, “Do you 
think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would 
they try to be fair?”  Results on these variables were not statistically significant. 
14  For both AGE and EDUCATION, several respondents did not respond. The mean 
age and education level for all participants was used for these observations 
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15  Participant’s reported income by indicating which among 10 categories described 
their income group. To reduce the expanding number of indicator variables used, these 
responses were converted to continuous data by entering for each observation the 
midpoint from its respective income category. As with AGE and EDUCATION, non-
responses were replaced with the mean income.   
16  Given similarities in the experimental goods considered, the potential exists for 
the policy tools to influence the proportion of total spending characterized as mitigation. 
Participants may shift spending between insurance and mitigation in response to 
changing policy regimes. An additional set of log-odds models (similar to Talberth et al. 
2006) was used to examine the influence of each policy tool on the proportion of total 
spending directed to mitigation. The estimated coefficients for each policy tools are for 
the most part not statistically significant. These results are available upon request 
